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1. Introduction
• Relevant events:
- the dot.com bubble 
- the recent financial crisis.
• Basic questions:
- Can the presence of ambiguity cause the under- and
overvaluation of assets?
- Can it explain the presence of bubbles, crises and 
recoveries?
• Answer:
- Yes
- Yes, if ... .
3Under- and Overvaluation of Ambiguous Assets
2. Some Related Literature
• Intuition of ambiguity 
- as in Knight (1921) and Keynes (1937).
• Modelling of ambiguity
- in the tradition of Schmeidler (1982/1989) 
- Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (2007).
• Dynamics of the ambiguity level
- dynamic inconsistency in updating, e.g. Gilboa and
Schmeidler (1993) and  Eichberger and Kelsey (1999)
- alternatively: following the intuition of ambiguity as in
Knight (1921) and Keynes (1937).
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• Ambiguity and behavioural finance
- Herding: Ford, Kelsey, Pang (2005)
- Momentum Trading: Kelsey, Kozhan and Pang (2010).
• Ambiguity and crises
- Bank runs: Spanjers (1999/2008a)
- Currency crises: Spanjers (1999/2008b)
- The financial crisis:  Spanjers (2010).
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Keynes (1937) gives a description of what is meant
by ambiguity:
“By „uncertain‟ knowledge, let me explain, I do not mean
merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is
only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this
sense, to uncertainty [...]. The sense in which I am using the
term is that [...] there is no scientific basis on which to form
any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not
know.”
[pp. 113-114]
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To Keynes, these implications are not without 
consequences for economic theory:
“[T]he fact that our knowledge of the future is fluctuating,
vague and uncertain, renders wealth a peculiarly unsuitable
subject for the methods of the classical economic theory. This
theory might work very well in a world in which economic
goods are necessarily consumed within a short interval of
their being produced. But it requires, I suggest, considerable
amendment if it is to be applied to a world in which the
accumulation of wealth for an indefinitely postponed future is
an important factor; and the greater the proportionate part
played by such wealth accumulation the more essential does
such amendment become.” [p. 113]
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He than continues to discuss its implications:
“Now a practical theory of the future [...] has certain marked 
characteristics. In particular, being based on so flimsy a 
foundation, it is subject to sudden and violent changes. The 
practise of calmness and immobility, of certainty and 
security, suddenly breaks down. New fears and hopes will, 
without warning, take charge of human conduct. The forces 
of disillusion may suddenly impose a new conventional basis 
of valuation. All these pretty, polite techniques, made for a 
well-panelled board room and a nicely regulated market are 
liable to collapse. At all times vague panic fears and equally 
vague and unreasoned hopes are not really lulled, and lie but 
a little way below the surface.” [pp. 114-115]
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3. Ambiguity
• Uncertainty can be distinguished in:
- (calculable) risk and
- (incalculable) ambiguity.
• Risks may fail to be calculable because either 
- one cannot make a reasonable probability 
estimate for the relevant states of nature, or
- one does not know the outcome that is obtained
for the specific states of nature.
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Investors who face ambiguity tend to:
• hope for the best (optimism) and/or
• fear the worst (pessimism).
Examples for situations with ambiguity are:
• after terrorist attacks of 9/11 
(prob. known, outcomes unknown, pessimism)
• BSE crisis 
(outcomes known, prob. unknown, pessimism) 
• Dot.com bubble 
(outcomes known, prob. unknown, optimism).
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4. The Basic Model
Investors
• Beliefs are described by:
- a probability estimate π over S.
- a level of confidence γ є [0,1] in π; 
η = 1 – γ denotes the level of ambiguity.
• Ambiguity attitude is described by:
a degree of optimism β є [0,1] where 
β = 0 represents full pessimism and 
β = 1 represents full optimism.
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• For state-contingent consumption the leads to in:
U(x, η; β) := (1 – η) E{u(x))} +  
η (1 – β) minsєS u(x(s))  +  
η β maxsєS u(x(s)).
• Investors are characterized by their ambiguity 
attitude β.
• Investors are uniformly distributed over [0,1].
• Each investor has one unit of wealth to invest.
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Assets
• Unambiguous asset with expected payout 1.
• Ambiguous asset:
- level of ambiguity η
- expected payout E{x} = E(η)
- institutionally determined ambiguity for the 
(targeted) marginal investor β is denoted by 
ηi(β).
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Investment in the ambiguous asset
• The critical level of ambiguity for investor β to 
invest in the ambiguous asset is denoted by 
ηp(β).
Equilibrium 
• A combination (η*, β*) of ambiguity level and 
marginal investor in the asset is an equilibrium 
if:
i)  η* = ηp(β*)
ii) η* = ηi(β*).
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5. An Example of Undervaluation
• Expected payout of the ambiguous asset
E{x}= E(η) := 1 + η.
• Possible payouts: x є [0, 2].
• This leads to 
U(x, η; β) := (1-n) E(η) 
+ η β maxsєS x(s) + η (1-β) minsєS x(s)
= (1-η) (1+η) + 2 η β + 0 =
-η2 + 2 η β + 1.
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•
•
U(x, η; β)
U
2 β
β 1 η
1+ β2 •
1 PC
ηp(β)
• The participation constraint: U(x, η; β) ≥ 1 yields
ηp(β) := 2 β.
• The level of ambiguity is determined by 
majority voting of the investors in the asset.
• For marginal voter β the median voter is 
βm(β) := 1/2 + 1/2 β.
• The optimal level of ambiguity for investor β is 
η*(β) := β
and
ηi(β) = 1/2 + 1/2 β.
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η
1
2/3
1/3 1 β
ηp(β)
ηi(β)
•
Investors
• If time passes, investors become more familiar 
with the ambiuous asset and the maximal level 
of ambiguity falls.
• For t є [0,1] the attainable levels of ambiguity 
η(t) are restricted to be in [0, ψ(t)] with
ψ(t) := 1 - t.
• It follows that 
β = 1/2 - 1/2 t
so
βm(β) := 1/2 + 1/2 β = 3/4 - 1/4 t
and
ηp(β) := (1-t) + (3/4 t - 1/4) = 3/4 - 1/4 t > 1 - t.
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η
1
β(t) 1 β
ηp(β)
•
Investors
ψ(t) =
1 - t
• If time passes, investors become more familiar 
with the ambiuous asset and the maximal level 
of ambiguity falls.
• The ambiguous asset becomes attractive for 
more cautious investors. 
• If it is not possible to futher increase investment 
in the ambiguous asset, its price increase.
• When the level ambiguity of the asset becomes 
sufficiently low, the price of the asset starts 
falling, reaching parity with the unambiguous 
asset for the ambiguity level of zero.
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6. An Example of Overvaluation
• Expected payout of the ambiguous asset 
E{x} = E(η) := 1-η.
• Possible payouts: x є [0, 2].
• This leads to 
U(x, η; β) := (1-η) E(η) +
η β maxsєS x(s) + η (1-β) minsєS x(s)
= (1-η) (1-η) + 2 η β + 0 =
η2 - 2 η (1-β) + 1.
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•
•
U(x, η; β)
U
β
1-β 1 η
2 β
•
1 PC
ηp(β)
•
• The participation constraint U(x, η; β) ≥ 1 yields
ηp(β) := 2 - 2 β.
• The ambiguity ηi(β) is determined by majority 
voting of the investors in the asset.
• For marginal voter β the median voter is 
βm(β) := 1/2 + 1/2 β.
• For η = 0: U(x, η; β) = 1
η = 1: U(x, η; β) = 2 β.
• The endogenous level of ambiguity is
= 0 if 1/2 + 1/2 β < 1/2
ηi(β) є {0, 1} if 1/2 + 1/2 β = 1/2
= 1 if 1/2 + 1/2 β > 1/2.
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•
• •
ηp(β)
ηi(β)
η
1
1/2 1 βInvestors
• If time passes, investors become more familiar 
with the ambiuous asset and the maximal 
attainable level of ambiguity ψ(t) falls.
• For t є [0,1] the attainable levels of ambiguity 
η(t) are restricted to be in [0, ψ(t)] 
with ψ(t) := t - 1.
• The marginal investor is β(t) = 1/2 + 1/2 t.
• The endogenous level of ambiguity is
= 0 if β < 1/2 + 1/2 t
ηi(β) є {0, 1 - t} if β = 1/2 + 1/2 t
= 1 - t if β > 1/2 + 1/2 t.
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•
•
•
ηp(β)
η
1
β(t) 1 β
ψ(t) =
1 - t
Investors
Illiquid asset
• If the ambiguous asset is illiquid, investors who no 
longer want to hold the assets cannot dis-invest in.
• But they find no buyers for the ambiguous asset.
• So the price of the asset - the willingness to pay of 
the marginal investor β - falls below 1.
• For some t, the median investor no longer pefers 
the maximum ambiguity over no ambiguity.
• The level of ambiguity abruptly falls to zero and 
the price recovers. 
• If there is inertia in the level of ambiguity, the 
shape of the utility function comes to bear: price 
falls (much) further before it recovers 
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•
•
•
ηp(β)
η
1
βm(t) 1 β
Investors
1/2
•
ψcrit (t) 
= 1/2
7. General Results
Theorem 1
Let ηi: [0, 1] ⇉[0, 1] be a non-empty and 
convex valued upper-hemi continuous 
correspondence and let ηp: [0,1] → ℝ be 
continuous function such that either 
ηi([0,1]) is a subset of ηp([0,1]) 
or vice versa.
Then an equilibrium exists.
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η
1
1 β
ηi(β)
ηi([0, 1]) ηp([0, 1])ηp(β)
•
β1
* β2
* β3
*
•
•
Theorem 2
Let ηi: [0, 1] ⇉[0, 1] be a correspondence
with a selection f: [0, 1] → [0, 1] that is an
increasing function and let ηp: [0,1] → ℝ be 
continuous function such that 
ηp([0,1]) is a subset of ηi([0,1]).
Then an equilibrium exists.
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ηp(β)
••
β1
* β2
*
ηi([0, 1])
••
8. Concluding Remarks
• Ambiguity can be a potential cause for under- and 
overvaluation.
• In our examples:
- if investors believe that increased ambiguity coincides 
with higher fundamental values, the asset is undervalued
and no bubble occurs.
- if investors believe that increased ambiguity coincides 
with lower fundamental values, the asset is overvalued
and a bubble will occur.
- if, in addition, the ambiguous asset is illiquid, there may
be a sudden fall in the level of ambiguity after a period 
of declining prices.   
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Agenda for further work:
1. relate under- and overvaluation to general 
properties of E(η).
2. endogenously derive ηi for an appropriate class 
of institutional environments.
3. develop a framework to in which multiple 
equilibria lead to coordination problems.
4. address the resulting equilibrium selection issue.
5. identify plausible properties for the decay 
process of ambiguity as described by ψ.
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